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REEVALUATING SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
RIGHTS IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 
AFRA AFSHARIPOUR∗ 
Introduction 
Shareholder voting plays a central role in corporate governance. Yet, for 
many public company acquisition transactions, only the target firm’s 
shareholders can exercise voting rights under corporate law. The lack of 
voting rights for shareholders of the acquiring (or bidder) firm is potentially 
problematic given anecdotal and empirical evidence that a large percentage 
of public company acquisitions involve negative returns for bidder 
shareholders. Recent research shows that compulsory shareholder voting 
reduces the problem of bidder overpayment. Despite this evidence, the 
response in corporate law has been muted. This article reviews the 
empirical and legal literature on the role of bidder shareholders in 
acquisitions and suggests ways that compulsory voting can be implemented 
in large public company acquisitions to reduce the overpayment problem. 
The popular press is replete with stories of bidder overpayment and 
poorly performing corporate acquisitions. The disastrous combination of 
firms such as America Online and Time Warner1 or the problem-laden 
                                                                                                                 
 * Afra Afsharipour, Professor of Law & Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research 
Scholar, UC Davis School of Law. This symposium article was developed for the Oklahoma 
Law Review Symposium, “Confronting New Market Realities: Implications for Stockholder 
Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue.” I am thankful to the Oklahoma Law Review and Professor 
Megan Shaner for inviting me to participate in this symposium. I am also grateful to Jill 
Fisch, Diego Valderrama, and the participants of the symposium for their valuable insights 
and comments. Khushi Desai provided outstanding research assistance. I appreciate the 
institutional support of UC Davis School of Law, particularly Dean Kevin Johnson and 
Associate Dean Madhavi Sunder. 
 1. See ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE THE 
ASHES 265–91 (2005) (providing a detailed description of the AOL-Time Warner transaction 
as “possibly the most notorious” deal from hell); Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner 
Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/ 
business/media/11merger.html (reporting that the 2000 deal valued the combined firm at 
$350 billion, and that ten years later the combined value of the companies, which have since 
separated, was about one-seventh of their combined value on the day of the merger); Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, A Slow Demise for a Deal from Hell, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 29, 
2009, 11:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/spins-splits-and-time-warners-
deal-from-hell/ (“That the AOL-Time Warner deal was one of the worst, if not the worst, in 
history, is a sad truism for the markets and mergers and acquisitions classrooms 
everywhere.”). 
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acquisition of Countrywide by Bank of America2 are often touted as 
examples of acquisitions that proved to be terrible deals for the acquirer. A 
company engrossed in an acquisition frenzy can end up overpaying for its 
target by significant amounts. For example, in September 2011, Hewlett 
Packard (“HP”), a venerated Silicon Valley firm, agreed to buy British 
company Autonomy for $10.3 billion—a decision that was controversial 
with HP shareholders who claimed that HP was overpaying for Autonomy.3 
Only a year later, HP announced a write-down of $8.8 billion related to the 
Autonomy acquisition with over $5 billion due to accounting irregularities 
at Autonomy.4 Not only did HP fail to realize the gains it expected from the 
Autonomy acquisition, but the transaction led to various lawsuits between 
HP and Autonomy management, and resulted in a large securities class 
action suit against HP.5 The Autonomy deal was just one in a string of 
questionable acquisitions by HP during a busy acquisition spree.6 
“[A] bad deal—whether the failure is rooted in the concept [i.e., the 
‘logic of the deal,’ that is, the business justification for the proposed 
acquisition], the price, or the execution—is probably the fastest legal means 
of destroying [the company’s] value.”7 A bad acquisition can result not 
only in a lower share price, but also loss of jobs as the acquirer suffers in 
the aftermath of a failed integration and the potential acquisition of massive 
problems that may not have been adequately addressed at the target entity. 
For example, Bank of America’s string of questionable empire-building 
acquisitions, including the $4 billion acquisition of Countrywide, saddled 
the firm with significant problems, including an estimated $40 billion in 
mortgage-related losses, legal expenses, and settlements.8 In the years 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Strife of Brian, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21529060 (recounting the troubles that were brought on Bank of America as a result of a 
string of questionable empire-building acquisitions, including the $4 billion acquisition of 
Countrywide that saddled the bank with an estimated $30 billion in mortgage-related losses). 
 3. See Richard Waters & Peter Campbell, HP Enterprise Seeks to End Autonomy Saga 
with Software Sale, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e657857a-7113-
11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. See Clive Longbottom, HP: Where Next for the Troubled Silicon Valley Giant, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/HP-
Where-next-for-the-troubled-Silicon-Valley-giant. 
 7. Ken Smith, The M&A Buck Stops at the Board: Directors Are Learning Fast How to 
Screen Out No-Win Deals, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER’S J., Apr. 1, 2006, at 48, 
49, 2006 WLNR 5570070. 
 8. See Ben Protess, Tallying the Costs of Bank of America’s Countrywide Nightmare, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 25, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/ 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/3
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following the acquisitions, Bank of America ended up selling some of the 
businesses that it acquired and laying off tens of thousands of employees.9 
Empirical evidence backs up the story of disastrous acquisition 
decisions. Studies have found that, in general, many large-scale acquisitions 
of public companies by other public companies result in significant losses 
for shareholders of acquiring firms.10 Not only do bidder shareholders lose, 
but the losses from the worst-performing deals can be staggering. For 
example, a study of deals from 1998 to 2001 finds that bidder shareholders 
lost 12% for every dollar spent on acquisitions, for a total of $240 billion.11 
Moreover, the study suggests that this is wealth destruction on an aggregate 
scale and not just a wealth transfer to target shareholders from bidder 
shareholders.12  
Studies suggest two non-mutually exclusive explanations for the 
overpayment problem: agency problems and behavioral biases. 
Acquisitions tend to highlight conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders in large public corporations.13 The acquirer’s management can 
benefit significantly from acquisitions through increased power, prestige, 
and additional compensation.14 Acquisitions can also be significantly 
                                                                                                                 
tallying-the-costs-of-bank-of-americas-countrywide-nightmare/; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & 
Susanne Craig, Bank of America Settles Suit over Merrill for $2.43 Billion, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 28, 2012, 8:49 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/bank-of-
america-to-pay-2-43-billion-to-settle-class-action-over-merrill-deal/. 
 9. See E. Scott Reckard, BofA Targets Highly Paid Investment Bankers in Latest 
Layoffs, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/02/business/la-fi-
0502-bank-america-layoffs-20120502; Deon Roberts, Bank of America Head Count Almost 
Down to 2008 Levels, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver. 
com/news/business/banking/article64138397.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO 
Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 34, 42 (2008). 
 11. Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of 
Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 757 (2005) [hereinafter 
Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction]. 
 12. See id. at 758-59.  
 13. Beginning with Berle and Means’ seminal work, agency cost problems have long 
dominated debates in U.S. corporate law about the conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–5, 119–25 (1932); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323, 328 (1986); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 14. See Leonce Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to 
Public Acquirers?, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 375, 376 (2008). For more on “empire building,” see 
Christopher Avery et al., Why Do Managers Undertake Acquisitions? An Analysis of 
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affected by various behavioral biases such as management overconfidence 
about the value of the deal (i.e. the “hubris hypothesis”) or management 
overestimation and overoptimism regarding its ability to execute the deal 
successfully.15  
Neither the right to sell nor the right to sue effectively addresses the 
bidder overpayment problem and the underlying factors contributing to it. 
Selling serves as a weak monitoring mechanism for bidder stockholders 
who often can only sell their shares after the share price has fallen 
following announcement of an acquisition transaction.16 Even the specter of 
a share drop following an acquisition announcement does little to deter 
bidder management given weaknesses in the market for corporate control.17 
Suing is similarly unattractive for bidder shareholders. “Suing generally has 
very large transaction costs: legal fees are high, acquiring information (for 
example, discovery) is costly, and the judicial system moves slowly.”18 
More important with respect to bidder shareholders, the barriers to a 
successful suit are quite high given that fiduciary duty cases by bidder 
shareholders will generally be subject to business judgment review.19 
Moreover, the types of soft conflicts tied to overpayment, as identified by 
the finance literature, are not the clear conflicts that often receive the 
attention of plaintiffs’ lawyers and thus the courts. 
Is it time to reassess the right to vote? Shareholder voting has long been 
viewed as a way of “reducing managerial agency costs and maintaining 
director accountability.”20 As the Delaware court famously noted in 
                                                                                                                 
Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 24–28, 42 
(1998); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 627–28 
(1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical 
Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 
1167–69, 1224–29, 1269–80 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulating]; John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 
(1986). 
 15. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 
212 (1986); see also RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND 
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50–62 (1992); Black, supra note 14, at 601–05, 624; Mark L. 
Sirower & Mark Golovcsenko, Returns from the Merger Boom, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: 
DEALMAKER’S J., Mar. 1, 2004, at 34, 2004 WLNR 18181954; Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 193–201 (1988). 
 16. See Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary 
Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2014).  
 17. See id.  
 18. Id. at 1375. 
 19. See id. at 1375 & n.4.  
 20. Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/3
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Blasius, “[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”21 Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Part II, in the U.S., management can easily avoid the 
shareholder vote for bidder shareholders in acquisition transactions. The 
fact that acquirers have the flexibility to structure their transactions to avoid 
the shareholder vote also makes it challenging to empirically study the 
effect of bidder shareholder votes on acquisitions in the U.S. Recent 
studies, however, have attempted to address the value of bidder shareholder 
voting in the U.S.22 In addition, an important, recent study has addressed 
the value of voting on acquisitions, looking at the U.K. market where 
shareholder voting on large acquisitions is mandatory and binding under the 
U.K. listing rules.23 As discussed in Part III below, the study of acquisitions 
made by U.K. companies between 1992 and 2010 shows that mandatory 
acquirer shareholder voting increases firm value with results indicating that 
with mandatory voting U.K. shareholders gained $13.6 billion over 1992–
2010 in aggregate (+$41 million on average), while without voting, U.K. 
shareholders lost $3 billion in aggregate. Moreover, the results of the study 
suggest that mandatory voting, which cannot be avoided by acquirer CEOs 
in the U.K. as it can be in the U.S., changes the incentive of acquirers and 
“imposes a constraint on the price that CEOs and boards can offer” in 
transactions subject to mandatory voting.24 
There are several ways to achieve voting rights for bidder shareholders, 
including private ordering through changes in the corporate contract, or 
changes in stock exchange rules akin to the requirements imposed by the 
listing rules in the U.K. Of course, such corporate governance proposals 
may take years to have an actual impact, and there may be political and 
economic reasons for stock exchanges to resist great shareholder voting 
rights. Nevertheless, given fundamental changes in the shareholder base of 
U.S. firms, voting in significant acquisitions may be more palatable now 
than ever.  
This article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the bidder 
overpayment problem and the empirical explanations for overpayment: 
agency problems and behavioral biases. Part II explains common 
                                                                                                                 
Investor, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4-5), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2972838 [hereinafter Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions]. 
 21. Blasius, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 22. See infra Section III.A. 
 23. Marco Becht et al., Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?, 
29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3035, 3037 (2016). 
 24. Id. at 3064. 
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acquisition deal structuring and how such structuring limits or eliminates 
the voting rights of bidder shareholders. Part II then provides a brief 
overview of why the shareholders’ rights to sell or sue do not provide 
sufficient protection to bidder shareholders nor are useful checks on the 
reasons for bidder overpayment. Part III describes the empirical literature 
on voting and bidder overpayment, including recent literature that strongly 
suggests that mandatory voting imposes constraints on bidder management 
and can serve as a deterrent to large, value-destroying acquisitions. Part III 
then examines the arguments for shareholder voting in public company 
acquisitions and ways to achieve voting rights. Part IV concludes. 
I. The Bidder Overpayment Problem and Its Roots 
Empirical studies commonly find that acquisition transactions, 
particularly significant transactions involving publicly traded targets and 
buyers, result in losses for bidder firms and their shareholders. Section A 
below briefly summarizes the overpayment literature. Sections B examines 
the two leading explanations for bidder overpayment. Studies have 
generally attributed overpayment to managerial agency costs (such as 
personal benefits in the form of increased compensation for management) 
and behavioral biases (such as ego and hubris) of bidder management. 
A. The Bidder Overpayment Problem 
Finance scholars have noted that “[e]xtensive empirical evidence shows 
that a large percentage of transactions involve negative returns for acquirer 
shareholders and that the losses from the worst performing deals are very 
large.”25 Initially, the examination of whether bidder shareholders win or 
lose in acquisitions was mixed.26 Some early studies on the wealth effects 
of acquisitions suggest that bidder shareholders benefit or remain neutral 
from acquisitions, while other studies report losses.27 A significant body of 
more recent empirical studies find, however, evidence that many, although 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. at 3036. 
 26. For an overview of the early literature on bidder performance in M&A transactions, 
see generally Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders’ Put Option: Counteracting the Acquirer 
Overpayment Problem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1018 (2012) [hereinafter Afsharipour, 
Shareholders’ Put Option]. 
 27. See generally Robert F. Bruner, Does M&A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the 
Decision-Maker, 12 J. APPLIED FIN. 48 (2002) (surveying over 100 studies published from 
1971 to 2001 on the results to shareholders of M&A transactions and finding that bidder 
shareholders essentially break even). 
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clearly not all, acquisitions destroy value for long-term bidder 
shareholders.28  
Bidder overpayment is particularly acute in the case of takeovers of 
publicly traded targets by publicly traded acquirers.29 A survey of the 
empirical literature on takeovers of U.S. targets from 1980 to 2005 finds 
that announcement-period cumulative average abnormal stock returns for 
bidder shareholders are close to zero for the overall sample of studies, with 
49% of bidders having negative cumulative abnormal stock returns.30 For 
bidder shareholders, acquisitions of large public targets by public company 
bidders represent a “worst-case scenario” with average acquirer 
announcement-period cumulative abnormal returns of a significant loss of 
2.21%.31  
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 103, 110–11 (2001); Christa H. S. Bouwman et al., Market Valuation and Acquisition 
Quality: Empirical Evidence, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 633, 636 (2009); Jarrad Harford et al., The 
Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 
247, 247–48, 260 (2012); Tim Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders 
Benefit from Corporate Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1773–89 (1997); Sara B. Moeller et 
al., Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 202, 226 (2004) 
[hereinafter Moeller et al., Firm Size]; Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction, supra note 11, at 
781; Gunther Tichy, What Do We Know About Success and Failure of Mergers?, 1 J. 
INDUSTRY COMPETITION & TRADE 347, 366–68 (2001). Some scholars argue that acquisition 
activity is driven by overvalued stock and that acquisitions by acquirers with overvalued 
stock can benefit the acquirer’s shareholders in the long run, as long as the target firm’s 
stock is less overvalued. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven 
Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295, 301–02 (2003). Other scholars challenge this proposition, 
finding that “overvalued acquirers often significantly overpay for the targets they purchase” 
and that such “acquisitions do not produce the necessary synergy gains.” Fangjian Fu et al., 
Acquisitions Driven by Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 24, 
25 (2013). Moreover, Fu et al. also find that “[o]vervalued acquirers incur significantly 
worse stock returns during the five years following acquisitions than the control firms that 
did not engage in mergers” and also experience “significant deterioration in operating 
performance”. Id. at 26. 
 29. See Harford et al., supra note 28, at 247–48. Studies suggest that private acquirers 
experience better post-acquisition performance than public acquirers because of lower 
agency problems. Andrey Golubov & Nan Xiong, Why Do Private Acquirers Outperform 
Public Acquirers? 26–27 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., 
Paper No. 482/2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834805. 
 30. Sandra Betton et al., Corporate Takeovers, in 2 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 291, 407 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008). 
 31. Id. There is some evidence that indicates that certain acquirers, companies such as 
Cisco and Berkshire Hathaway, tend to be very good at acquisitions and the performance of 
the best acquirers persists from deal to deal, while bad acquirers continue to perform poorly. 
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Empirical evidence suggests that the losses suffered by bidder 
shareholders in the largest and worst-performing deals are very 
significant.32 The studies by Moeller et al. indicate that managers of large 
firms pay more for acquisitions, and that premiums paid to targets are larger 
when the acquirer is larger.33 Other studies find that “the relative size of the 
target to the acquirer is more important for acquirer shareholder value” and 
that acquirer shareholders returns are better when the bidder purchases a 
small firm versus when it attempts “mergers of equals or transformational 
M&A deals.”34 
B. What Explains Bidder Overpayment? Agency Costs & Behavioral Biases 
Studies identify two non-exclusive explanations for the bidder 
overpayment problem: agency problems and behavioral biases. 
1. Agency Costs 
Both legal and finance scholars have pointed to agency costs in 
explaining bidder overpayment.35 Acquisitions highlight divergent 
shareholder-manager incentives and provide an opportunity for managers to 
obtain personal gain at the expense of shareholders. Michael Jensen’s free 
cash flow hypothesis, for example, theorized that equity overvaluation 
allows “managers [to] realize large personal gains from empire building and 
predict[ed] that firms with abundant cash flows but few profitable 
investment opportunities are more likely to make value-destroying 
acquisitions than to return the excess cash flows to shareholders.”36 Several 
studies support Jensen’s theory and provide evidence that the acquirer’s 
management can benefit significantly from acquisitions through increased 
power, prestige, and additional compensation.37  
                                                                                                                 
See generally Andrey Golubov et al., Extraordinary Acquirers, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 314 
(2015). 
 32. See Moeller et al., Firm Size, supra note 28, at 202, 226; Moeller et al., Wealth 
Destruction, supra note 11, at 781. 
 33. See Moeller et al., Firm Size, supra note 28, at 202, 226. 
 34. Eliezer M. Fich et al., Large Wealth Creation in Mergers and Acquisitions 2–3 
(Aug. 8, 2016) (AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2020507 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2020507. 
 35. See, e.g., Black, supra note 14, at 627-28; Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at 
1167–69, 1224–29; Jensen, supra note 13, at 323; Ronald W. Masulis et al., Corporate 
Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1852 (2007). 
 36. Masulis et al., supra note 35, at 1852 (citing Jensen, supra note 13). 
 37. See Bargeron et al., supra note 14, at 376; Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO 
Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 121 
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Several studies point to CEO compensation as the motive behind 
acquisitions, particularly those that lead to overpayment. For example, a 
study by Jarrad Harford and Kai Li finds that CEOs benefit personally from 
making acquisitions even when such acquisitions have poor outcomes for 
shareholders.38 These acquisitions may provide the board and the CEO a 
“natural opportunity” to increase the CEO’s compensation since the 
increase in firm size and operations allows “the CEO to argue for more pay 
and for pay that is less sensitive to performance for the first few years of the 
acquisition.”39 Others have similarly argued that CEO compensation, rather 
than shareholder value creation, is likely the primary reason for 
acquisitions, even for overvalued acquirers.40 For example, Fu et al. find 
that “acquirer CEOs in overvaluation-driven acquisitions obtain substantial 
pecuniary benefits following these transactions, specifically large, new 
restricted stock and option grants.”41 The study also finds that the increases 
in CEO compensation “often outweigh the relatively small decreases in the 
value of the CEO’s equity holding in the acquiring firm.”42 
From a corporate governance perspective, studies indicate that 
acquisitions made by entrenched management destroy the most value for 
bidder shareholders.43 Studies suggest that in firms with significant 
takeover defenses, managers can “make unprofitable acquisitions without 
facing a serious threat of losing corporate control.”44 Moreover, in firms 
with overvalued stock, studies have found that acquiring firms with “weak 
governance structures prior to their acquisition attempts” tend to 
significantly overpay for the companies they buy and that such acquisitions 
do not produce the intended synergy gains.45 Researchers have identified 
                                                                                                                 
(2004) (showing that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive 
significantly larger M&A bonuses, but these bonuses are not related to deal performance); 
see also Jarrad Harford & Kai Li, Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The 
Case of Acquiring CEOs, 62 J. FIN. 917, 919 (2007). For more on “empire building,” see 
sources cited supra note 14. 
 38. See Harford & Li, supra note 37, at 919; see also Richard T. Bliss & Richard J. 
Rosen, CEO Compensation and Bank Merger, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 108 (2001) (finding that 
CEO compensation in bank mergers increases even if the merger causes the acquirer’s stock 
price to decline). 
 39. Harford & Li, supra note 37, at 918. 
 40. See Fu et al., supra note 28, at 25–26. 
 41. Id. at 26. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Masulis et al., supra note 35, at 1853.  
 44. Id. at 1854. 
 45. Fu et al., supra note 28, at 26.  
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several factors for value destruction by entrenched management. Per two 
recent studies, entrenched bidder management (1) disproportionately avoids 
private targets, which have been shown to be associated with value-
creation;46 (2) tends to not pay with stock when buying a private company 
target, thus avoiding the governance benefits that would otherwise accrue 
from creating a blockholder in the bidder; and (3) tends to both overpay and 
acquire low-synergy targets.47 
2. Behavioral Biases 
Behavioral biases may play an important role in corporate transactions.48 
Acquisitions, in particular, can be affected by management overconfidence 
about the value of the deal (i.e. the “hubris hypothesis”), management’s 
overestimation of and overoptimism regarding its ability to execute the deal 
successfully, and management’s desire to win or sunk cost biases.49 
Several studies have empirically tested the role of management biases in 
acquisition decisions. In Mathew L.A. Hayward and Donald C. Hambrick’s 
examination of 106 large acquisitions, they find “losses in acquiring firms’ 
shareholder wealth following an acquisition, and the greater the CEO hubris 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Micah S. Officer, The Price of Corporate Liquidity: Acquisition Discounts for 
Unlisted Targets, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 571 (2007). 
 47. See Harford et al., supra note 28, at 247. 
 48. See generally James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1984); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith and 
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, 
and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853 (1995); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of 
the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 
(2002); Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65 (2011) [hereinafter Langevoort, The Behavioral]; Lynn 
A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 635 (2003). 
 49. See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors 
in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1354–81 (2001); sources cited supra 
note 15; see also, e.g., Vicki Bogan & David Just, What Drives Merger Decision Making 
Behavior? Don’t Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t Change Your Mind, 72 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 930, 932 (2009) (noting that confirmation bias, “a situation in which an individual 
attaches too much importance to information that supports his views,” impacts merger 
decisions); Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on 
Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 139, 139 (2010) 
(examining “when and why potentially self-damaging competitive motivations and 
behaviors will emerge”); Deepak Malhotra et al., When Winning Is Everything, HARV. BUS. 
REV., May 2008, at 78, 80 (identifying “three principal drivers of competitive arousal in 
business settings: rivalry, time pressure, and audience scrutiny”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/3
2017]        REEVALUATING SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS 137 
 
 
and acquisition premiums, the greater the shareholder losses” following an 
acquisition.50 Moreover, Hayward and Hambrick’s study also indicates that 
the relationship between acquisition premiums and CEO hubris is stronger 
in cases where the board has a high proportion of inside directors and a 
CEO who also serves as chair of the board.51 Ulrike Malmendier and 
Geoffrey Tate’s study of the role of CEO overconfidence similarly suggests 
that overconfident CEOs tend to overpay.52 The study finds “that the odds 
of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as 
overconfident,” and that “[t]he effect is largest if the merger is diversifying 
and does not require external financing.”53 The study suggests that the 
market reaction for merger announcements by an overconfident CEO is 
significantly more negative than for announcements by non-overconfident 
CEOs.54 
Behavioral biases may be amplified by advisors, including investment 
bankers, consultants who have been hired to undertake significant 
integration efforts, and even lawyers advising acquirers.55 Investment 
bankers, for example, are commonly conflicted in M&A transactions.56 
Bidders often use bankers to provide valuation assistance and fairness 
opinions in acquiring targets, but the vast bulk of an advisor’s 
compensation for this work depends on completion of the transaction.57 In 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Mathew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for 
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 103, 103 (1997). Hayward 
and Hambrick identify four indicators of CEO hubris as relevant to the acquisition premium, 
“the acquiring company’s recent performance, recent media praise for the CEO, a measure 
of the CEO’s self-importance, and a composite factor of these three variables.” Id.; see also 
Arijit Chatterjee & Donald C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive 
Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351, 
351–52 (2007) (arguing that narcissistic CEOs favor strategic dynamism and grandiosity, 
and tend to deliver extreme and volatile performance for their organizations).  
 51. See Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 50, at 117–18. 
 52. See Malmendier & Tate, supra note 10, at 20; see also Ulrike Malmendier & 
Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2661 
(2005) (“Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and 
view external funds as unduly costly.”).  
 53. Malmendier & Tate, supra note 10, at 20. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Krishnan and Masulis find that top bidder law firms are “associated with 
significantly higher takeover premia." C. N. V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm 
Expertise and Merger and Acquisition Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189 (2013). 
 56. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, When a Bank Works Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/business/yourmoney/08deal.html. 
 57. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1586–87 
(2006). 
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cases where management stands to benefit from doing a deal, the often 
“close relationship” between company management and financial advisors 
can induce advisors to recommend transactions in order to “avoid 
displeasing management.”58  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that despite CEO biases, often the board 
does not effectively stand in management’s way in large acquisitions. Once 
management and its advisors begin to feel committed to a deal and have 
expended significant resources to move forward on a transaction, 
abandoning plans can be quite difficult. For example, HP’s then-board chair 
allegedly attempted to raise concerns about the Autonomy acquisition, but 
then-CEO Leo Apotheker was reluctant to back away, and the board did not 
press any further.59 The reluctance to abandon an acquisition can be strong 
even in the face of significant shareholder opposition. As discussed in Part 
II below, there are many ways in the U.S. for acquirers to avoid or take 
away the ability of bidder shareholders to express their opposition to an 
acquisition.60 
II. The Rights of Bidder Shareholders in Acquisitions: 
Selling, Suing, and Voting 
Two structures—a one-step triangular merger, or a two-step transaction 
involving a tender offer followed by a merger—are often used to acquire 
publicly traded firms in the U.S.61 Under both structures, target 
shareholders are commonly provided a say, either through a vote or through 
the decision to sell their shares. In addition, target shareholders can seek 
access to courts to address any harm they have suffered. U.S. law, however, 
does little to address harm to bidder shareholders. Transactions can be 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Tamar Frankel, The Influence of Investment Banks on Corporate Governance, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 352, 357–58 (Claire A. Hill 
& Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); see also Davidoff, supra note 57, at 1587. 
 59. See Barb Darrow, HP’s Ray Lane Tried to Kill Autonomy Deal, Documents Show, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/26/hps-ray-lane-tried-to-kill-
autonomy-deal/. 
 60. See Stephen Bainbridge, How and Why Kraft Is Evading Shareholder Voting in the 
Cadbury Deal, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 11:27 AM), http:// 
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/evading-shareholder-voting-
in-a-merger.html; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Warren Buffett’s Lost Vote, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2010, 9:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/warren-
buffetts-lost-vote/. 
 61. See John C. Coates, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Restructuring: Types, Regulation, 
and Patterns of Practice 4-5 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 781, 
2014), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Coates_781.pdf. 
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structured so that under state corporate law or stock exchange listing rules, 
bidder shareholders are excluded from any decision-making role in 
acquisitions.62 Moreover, bidder shareholders cannot meaningfully seek any 
redress through the courts. 
This section begins by recounting the limited voting rights that bidder 
shareholders have in acquisition transactions. It then provides a brief 
overview of why neither the shareholders’ rights to sell or sue provide 
sufficient protection to bidder shareholders nor are useful checks on the 
factors that contribute to bidder overpayment. 
A. Bidder Shareholder Voting Rights 
Public company acquirers commonly use two types of transactional 
structures to purchase other public companies—triangular mergers and 
tender offers.63 As explained below, under both structures, bidder 
shareholders are often deprived of voting rights. 
1. Triangular Mergers 
Over the past several decades, the triangular merger structure has 
emerged as one of the most popular acquisition structures. The triangular 
merger is a popular method for acquiring a firm for many reasons, 
including survivor liability issues because the bidder can acquire the target 
as a separate entity without having to incorporate it into the bidder 
corporation itself. Moreover, triangular acquisitions also have benefits 
related to preservation of the licenses and contracts of the target and 
potential tax benefits.64  
One of the most important considerations for public companies, 
particularly for those incorporated in Delaware, is using the triangular 
structure to deprive bidder shareholders of voting and appraisal rights.65 
                                                                                                                 
 62. For a detailed discussion of this structuring, see generally Afra Afsharipour, Deal 
Structure and Minority Shareholders, in COMPARATIVE TAKEOVER REGULATION: GLOBAL 
AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES (Umakanth Varottil & Wan Wai Yee, eds.) (forthcoming 2017) 
[hereinafter Afsharipour, Deal Structure]. 
 63. See Coates, supra note 61, at 4–5.  
 64. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 56–57 (3d ed. 2012); 
THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 
105–07 (3d ed. 2013). 
 65. Kimble C. Cannon and Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder 
Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and 
Maximizing Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 725, 762. The triangular merger also has several other benefits related to 
successor liability, tax and accounting issues.  
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Under Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) section 251(c), only 
shareholders of a “constituent” corporation are entitled to vote on the 
transaction, and under section 262(b)(2), appraisal rights are similarly 
available only to voting shareholders of a “constituent” corporation to the 
merger.66 In a triangular structure, however, the actual bidder is not one of 
the “constituent” corporations; instead, it is the bidder’s shell subsidiary 
that merges with the target company.67  
The ability of public company bidders to avoid a vote is somewhat 
limited in transactions where the acquisition structure involves the bidder’s 
stock. If the bidder needs to amend its charter to authorize the additional 
stock being issued in the transaction, bidder shareholders will in essence be 
voting on the acquisition since “shareholders will be voting on the 
amendment [with] full knowledge that the amendment is necessary to effect 
the deal as structured.”68 Stock exchange rules may also require the bidders 
to solicit a vote of bidder shareholders if the bidder will be issuing stock 
amounting to more than 20% of its outstanding shares.69 Bidders can, 
                                                                                                                 
 66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 262(b)(2) (West 2016). Appraisal rights allow 
shareholders to refuse to accept the consideration offered in a deal and instead turn to the 
courts to determine the “fair value” of their shares. Until recently, appraisal was viewed as a 
limited remedy because of significant costs and delays connected with the exercise of 
appraisal rights, and the uncertainties of the valuation process. For an overview of the 
appraisal process and debates about its value, see Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, 
Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 
1558–66 (2015). More recently, appraisal actions have gained some steam due to certain 
sophisticated investors, particularly hedge funds, acting as dissenting shareholders. See 
Korsmo & Myers, supra, at 1568. The rise in appraisal litigation has been rife with 
controversy and efforts to limit appraisal cases. See e.g. Craig Boyd, Appraisal Arbitrage: 
Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist Shareholders, 65 KAN. L. REV. 497, 
522 (2016). Several scholars, however, cautioned against closing the door to appraisal, 
arguing that appraisal cases play an important corporate governance role and may have 
significantly more value than other types of shareholder litigation. See generally Charles 
Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits 
Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829 (2014); Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall S. 
Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J. LAW & ECON. 697 
(2016); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Delaware Effort to Protect Shareholders May End Up 
Hurting Them, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/business/dealbook/delaware-effort-to-protect-
shareholders-may-end-up-hurting-them.html?_r=0. 
 67. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 56. 
 68. Bainbridge, supra note 60. 
 69. See NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES r. 5635(a)(1)(B) (amended 2009), 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/ (follow “Rule 5000” hyperlink; then follow “5600. 
Corporate Governance Requirements” hyperlink; then scroll down to Rule 5635); NYSE, 
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however, structure their transactions to include a combination of cash and 
stock where the stock component constitutes no more than 19.9% of issued 
and outstanding bidder shares.70 
But even if bidder shareholders do get a vote based on charter 
amendment or stock exchange rules, they would not receive appraisal rights 
under state corporate law.  
2. Tender Offers 
Tender offers are the other common acquisition structure used by public 
company acquirers.  
The Williams Act, which is codified in sections 13(d) and 14(d)(1) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), regulates tender 
offers.71 Much of the focus of the Williams Act is on protecting the target 
company shareholders.72 While shareholders of the target have layers of 
protection encompassed within the Exchange Act rules in tender offer 
transactions, bidder shareholders in general have little protection under 
federal or state corporate law. The Williams Act does not squarely address 
the rights of bidder shareholders. 
Similarly, state corporate law often excludes a role for bidder 
shareholders in tender offers. Delaware law does not include a statutory 
requirement for bidder shareholders to have a vote in a tender offer 
transaction.73 Thus, unless the acquirer does not have enough authorized 
                                                                                                                 
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c)–(d) (amended 2015), http://nysemanual.nyse. 
com/lcm/ (follow “Section 303A.00” hyperlink). The voting requirements under both the 
NYSE and NASDAQ rules do not require a vote of a majority of the outstanding shares. See 
NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES r. 5635(e) (requiring a majority of votes cast on a 
particular proposal); id. r. 5620(c) (requiring at least one-third of all voting shares to be 
present for purposes of a quorum); NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.07 (amended 
2013) (requiring a majority of the voting shares for approval, so long as over 50% of the 
voting shares participate in the vote). 
 70. See Afsharipour, Shareholders’ Put Option, supra note 26, at 1046–47. 
 71. For an overview of the history of the Williams Act, see generally Christina M. 
Sautter, Tender Offers and Disclosure: The History and Future of the Williams Act, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 352 (Claire A. Hill & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016). 
 72. See Afsharipour, Deal Structure, supra note 62, at 9. 
 73. See Joel Edan Friedlander, Overturn Time-Warner Three Different Ways, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 631, 641–43 (2008). Some jurisdictions, most notably California, provide bidder 
shareholders a vote in tender offers where the consideration consists of the stock of the 
acquirer’s shareholders. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201.5 (West 1990). Like the voting rules 
in other types of acquisition transactions, the exception under section 1201.5(b) of the 
California Corporations Code provides that approval is not needed by the shareholders of an 
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and unissued shares in a stock-for-stock tender offer, bidder shareholders 
have no voting rights under state corporate law.74 Moreover, if the bidder is 
using cash or less than 20% of its outstanding stock as the acquisition 
currency, then the stock exchange rules necessitating a shareholder vote 
would not apply.  
B. Shareholders’ Rights to Sell or Sue 
Shareholder rights are not limited to voting rights. Shareholders unhappy 
with corporate decisions may also sell their shares—in other words, 
exercise their “wall street vote,” or attempt to bring litigation against the 
board, in particular through fiduciary duty litigation. Yet, both the right to 
sell and the right to sue have failed to temper bidder overpayment and its 
underlying causes. 
1. Why the Right to Sell May Not Sufficiently Counter Bidder 
Overpayment 
One of the key rights held by shareholders, particularly public company 
shareholders, is the right to sell shares at will.75 Scholars have long hailed 
the right to sell shares as particularly strong and important to shareholders 
“because it is a means of obtaining economic benefit from their investment 
in the corporation and because it is their means of exit should they become 
dissatisfied with management.”76 The right to sell has been described as 
“robust”77 and as a primary mechanism to address agency problems in 
companies.78 Henry Manne famously argued that a decrease in share price 
as a result of discontented shareholders selling their shares would provide 
                                                                                                                 
entity which will own more than 83.3% (or five-sixths) of the voting power of the surviving 
corporation immediately after the transaction. See id. § 1201.5(b). 
 74. See Friedlander, supra note 73, at 641–43. 
 75. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the 
Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 304 
(2001). There are some restrictions on the right to sell shares, such as federal securities laws 
with respect to insider trading and limitations imposed via contract. See generally Julian 
Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of Shareholders, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 415–16 
(2006). 
 76. Velasco, supra note 75, at 425. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 
VA. L. REV. 259, 273 (1967). For an overview of the literature on the right to sell, see 
generally James J. Park, The Limits of the Right to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate 
Law, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 159 (2017). 
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an opportunity to third parties to replace inefficient management.79 
According to Manne, “[t]he lower the stock price, relative to what it could 
be with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover 
becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more 
efficiently.”80 
The right to sell, however, is not without limitation. In the context of 
bidder overpayment, it is not clear that post-announcement sale of shares 
has to date disciplined public company managers in their acquisition 
decisions. Bidder shareholders do not usually have information about an 
upcoming acquisition until the acquisition is announced, typically 
immediately after the parties sign the acquisition agreement. The response 
of shareholders to many large public company acquisitions has been to sell 
their shares, resulting in the phenomenon that bidder share prices often 
react negatively upon announcement of an acquisition of a public 
company.81 Nevertheless, once an acquisition agreement has been signed, 
even if bidder shareholders react negatively to the announced deal, the 
opportunity for the bidder to walk away is low.82 In the case of a bad 
acquisition decision, then, bidder shareholders are rarely able to protect 
themselves from significant losses. Moreover, since bidder shareholders 
often do not have voting rights in acquisition decisions, bidder management 
is not particularly incentivized to gauge shareholder reaction to an 
acquisition prior to an announcement. 
In addition, the destruction of long-term value of the acquiring firm, as 
demonstrated by firms such as HP, often arises long after managers have 
left the firm. Even if the managers stick around, “[s]elling shares effectively 
disciplines management only if the market for corporate control is 
robust.”83 The market for corporate control, however, has been substantially 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 112 (1965). 
 80. Id. at 113. 
 81. See Kathleen Fuller et al., What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence 
from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions, 57 J. FIN. 1763, 1764 (2002). 
 82. See Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse 
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1173–78 (2010). The ability of a buyer to walk 
away from a transaction prior to closing is often subject to a material adverse change (MAC) 
or material adverse effect in the seller’s business. Convincing a court that a MAC has 
occurred in the seller’s business has proved to be difficult for buyers. MAYNARD, supra note 
64, at 383-86. 
 83. Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1366. 
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eroded by directors’ ability to adopt significant defensive tactics, such as 
poison pills.84 
2. Shortcomings in Fiduciary Duty Litigation 
In addition to the right to sell, shareholders also hold the right to sue. In 
acquisition transactions, particularly large public company deals, both the 
boards of the bidder and target generally consider and vote on the 
transaction. The boards’ involvement in these transactions, which for 
targets is often statutorily mandated, can then expose the boards to potential 
fiduciary duty claims from shareholders. The claims raised by shareholders 
in fiduciary duty cases often involve issues surrounding the business 
judgment rule, the duty of care, and the duty of loyalty (including good 
faith).85 
Corporate law casebooks are replete with cases where shareholders of 
the target company have brought fiduciary duty claims against the target’s 
board. The Delaware courts’ case law on the fiduciary duties of target 
boards is a mainstay of U.S. corporate law debates.86 Fiduciary duty 
litigation against target boards is often expected in large public company 
acquisition transactions.87  
                                                                                                                 
 84. See generally Christine Hurt, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137 
(2016). 
 85. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167 (2004). The 
Delaware courts have opined that failure to act in good faith is in essence a failure of the 
duty of loyalty. In other words, failing to act in good faith means that a Board has 
intentionally failed “to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious 
disregard for his duties.” Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) 
(quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). 
 86. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 
(Del. 1986) (holding that in the event of a change or control or break-up of the company, 
enhanced scrutiny applied); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 
1985) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty 
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business 
judgment rule may be conferred.”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711–15 (Del. 
1983) (holding that in freeze-out mergers the requirements of entire fairness, including fair 
dealing and fair price, applied). See generally J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of 
Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 9–11, 53–54 
(2013) (examining the Revlon standard and its progeny).  
 87. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 85, at 135, 137 (documenting the rise of 
merger litigation between 1999 and 2000). The last decade witnessed a staggering increase 
in merger litigation, as evidence by Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s comprehensive study of 
1117 transactions from 2005 through 2011. See Matthew D. Caine & Stephen Davidoff 
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Unlike the vast number of fiduciary duty cases against target boards, 
fiduciary duty cases against bidder boards are rarely brought and even more 
rarely successfully litigated.88 Theoretically, bidder boards’ decision-
making role in major acquisitions could make the boards vulnerable to 
shareholder lawsuits. This theoretical possibility, however, is unlikely to 
come to fruition. The study by Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. 
Thomas, for example, shows that most fiduciary duty suits challenge 
director actions in the sale of a company, rather than director actions with 
respect to the decision to acquire a company.89 Despite the vast increase in 
M&A litigation, plaintiff lawyers do not often endeavor to bring fiduciary 
duty suits against bidder boards given that the value of such suits is rather 
low. Moreover, in the few cases that have been brought against bidder 
boards, shareholders have not been successful.90 
The norm of deference to board decision-making plays a powerful role in 
curtailing suits against bidder boards. No established body of case law 
examines fiduciary duties of bidder boards.91 In general, courts’ usual 
response to a shareholder complaint92 in an acquisition negotiated on an 
arm’s-length basis is to apply the highly deferential business judgment 
standard of review to the allegations of the complaint.93 If the board’s 
decision to acquire the target is merely careless or negligent, such a 
                                                                                                                 
Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 465, 475–77 (2015). The rise in merger litigation was substantially curtailed in 2015 
due in large part to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s refusal to approve immaterial 
disclosure-only settlements. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover 
Litigation in 2015 3 (Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished report), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890. 
 88. See Afsharipour, Shareholders’ Put Option, supra note 26, at 1055–60. 
 89. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 85, at 167.  
 90. See, e.g., In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010); Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 
2000). 
 91. See Lawrence. A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-For-Stock Mergers and Some 
Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 909 (2003). 
 92. Shareholders can bring fiduciary duty claims directly if they, rather than the 
corporation, suffered the injury. Such direct claims tend to be limited to claims brought by 
shareholders of target companies. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 85, at 167–68.  
 93. The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, 
that judgment will be respected by the courts.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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decision does not amount to a duty of care violation.94 To be clear, in these 
duty of care cases, shareholders’ only option is to attack the board’s 
decision-making process rather than the actual business result.95 Even if the 
board violates its duty of care—that is, the board is grossly negligent in the 
process it undertook to approve the deal—a damages claim against directors 
for violations of the duty of care is unavailable because most companies’ 
charters include a statutory exculpation provision limiting such claims.96 
Duty of loyalty litigation is also not generally fruitful in arms-length 
acquisitions. The types of agency costs identified in the bidder overpayment 
literature tend to be soft conflicts that are hard to address through litigation 
and the courts.97 These soft conflicts differ from the classic duty of loyalty 
cases—often involving controlling shareholders or management buyouts—
that arise in merger-related litigation.98 Moreover, alleging bad faith by 
bidder shareholder plaintiffs is even more difficult, as the courts have stated 
that bad faith, in a transactional context, requires an “extreme set of 
facts . . . premised on the notion that disinterested directors were 
intentionally disregarding their duties.”99 
Despite these litigation challenges, some scholars have previously 
advocated for greater judicial responses to the bidder overpayment 
problem.100 Others, concerned with the high costs of litigation, have warned 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (articulating that the 
standard for determining a breach of the duty of care is gross negligence), overruled in part 
on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 95. See E. Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate 
Transactions, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002). 
 96. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2016).  
 97. Commentators often refer to the concept of soft conflicts, for example situations 
where management may not be on both sides of a transaction in a way that clearly implicates 
the duty of loyalty, but where management may for self-interested reasons steer a transaction 
in a certain direction. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Documenting the Deal: How Quality 
Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-making and Reduce the Litigation 
Target Zone, 70 BUS. LAW. 679 (2015). 
 98. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of 
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2004) (finding that after Delaware 
adopted section 102(b)(7) allowing companies to opt out of liability for the duty of care, the 
bulk of derivative suits brought in Delaware were duty of loyalty claims involving conflicted 
director actions). 
 99. In re Dow Chem. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *10 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 11, 2010) (quoting Lyondell Chem. Corp. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009)). 
 100. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Unprofitable Mergers: Toward a Market-Based 
Legal Response, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 777, 784 (1986); James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger 
Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 
341–44 (2001); Hamermesh, supra note 91, at 900–11. 
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against litigation as a tool to address bidder overpayment.101 Given the 
dearth of buy-side shareholder litigation, it is unclear whether greater 
judicial scrutiny of board decisions could address the agency costs or 
behavioral biases contributing to bidder overpayment.  
III. Reassessing Shareholder Voting in Acquisitions 
Is it time to reexamine voting given the existing, relatively low voting 
incidences and shortcomings with selling and suing?  
Several prominent legal scholars have suggested shareholder voting 
rights for bidder shareholders, but much of this debate has been muted over 
the past ten years. In response to the contemporary empire-building 
literature of the 1980s, Professor Coffee suggested the adoption of a rule 
that would require a tender offer acquirer to obtain approval from the 
acquirer’s own shareholders.102 Professor Coffee explained that requiring 
acquirer shareholder approval would discourage inefficient empire-building 
and acquirer overpayment, while preserving the market for corporate 
control.103 Similarly, in his article explaining the overpayment hypothesis, 
Professor Black agreed that Professor Coffee’s suggestion was an option 
worth exploring.104 In particular, scholars have argued for shareholder 
voting rights for bidder shareholders in certain acquisitions, such as 
transactions over a certain size.105 
Whether shareholder voting can be a tool to address bidder overpayment 
is an important empirical question to which finance studies have turned 
several times. Section A below addresses the empirical research on voting 
and bidder overpayment, including recent literature that strongly suggests 
that mandatory voting imposes constraints on acquirer CEOs and can serve 
as a deterrent to large value-destroying acquisitions. Section B then 
discusses the arguments for shareholder voting in public company 
acquisitions. Section C examines the ways to achieve voting rights. Section 
C then addresses arguments against shareholder voting. 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Black, supra note 14, at 651. For a discussion of litigation agency costs, see 
Afsharipour, Shareholders’ Put Option, supra note 26, at 1070-71. 
 102. See Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at 1269–72. While Professor Dent raised 
several objections to the shareholder voting proposal put forth by Professor Coffee, he 
acknowledged that it would be an improvement to the lack of protection under corporate law 
for bidder shareholders. See Dent, supra note 100, at 786–94. 
 103. See Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at 1269. 
 104. See Black, supra note 14, at 652. 
 105. See, e.g., Coffee, Regulating, supra note 14, at 1281–82; Hamermesh, supra note 
91, at 911.  
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A. Empirical Studies of the Effects of Bidder Shareholder Voting 
Studies have empirically assessed the effects of shareholder voting in 
addressing bidder overpayment and the root causes of overpayment. Several 
recent papers provide important insights on whether mandatory shareholder 
voting can prevent bidder overpayment. 
Most of the research on voting by bidder shareholders in acquisitions has 
been conducted on U.S. transactions. Undertaking empirical assessments of 
U.S. acquisitions, however, is challenging for multiple reasons. Under U.S. 
corporate law rules and listing standards, voting on acquisitions is up to the 
bidder’s management, and the management can choose to structure its 
acquisition to avoid a vote by bidder shareholders. Management can even 
amend the voting rights of bidder shareholders after the announcement of a 
deal if it appears that shareholders might oppose the transaction.106 
One of the earliest studies of bidder shareholder approval by Timothy R. 
Burch et al. finds that merger proxy votes may provide some monitoring of 
management even though approval rates for votes on acquisitions are higher 
than other types of shareholder votes.107 Another early study by Jim Hsieh 
and Qinghai Wang suggests that shareholder voting rights could discourage 
opportunistic behavior by bidder management. Hsieh and Wang find that 
“acquisitions without acquirer shareholder approval are associated with 
lower synergistic gains, both in percentage and dollar values.”108 Their 
study also presented evidence that “deals without shareholder voting rights 
are associated with worse post-merger stock or operating performance than 
those with voting rights. This indicates that the requirements of shareholder 
voting help deter management from pursuing mergers that are not favored 
by shareholders.”109 Other working papers, however, do not find much 
evidence of the value of bidder shareholder voting.110 
Recently, two working papers on the value of bidder shareholder voting 
reached differing results from each other. Paul Mason, Mike Stegemoller 
and Steven Utke examine the initial implementation of NASDAQ’s 1989 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See sources cited supra note 60. 
 107. See Timothy R. Burch et al., Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-
Stock Mergers Perfunctory?, FIN. MGMT., Winter 2004, at 45, 51. 
 108. Jim Hsieh & Qinghai Wang, Shareholder Voting Rights in Mergers and 
Acquisitions 5 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www1.american.edu/academic. 
depts/ksb/finance_realestate/rhauswald/seminar/vote_American.pdf. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on Acquisitions Matter? 2, 4–5 
(Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 64, 2006), http://law. 
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adoption of the rule requiring a shareholder vote when the bidder issues 
20% or more of its stock.111 Mason et al. find that firms altered the structure 
of their transactions to avoid a shareholder vote, often by using seasoned 
equity offerings prior to an acquisition announcement.112 Nevertheless, 
when examining the performance of acquisitions following the enactment 
of the NASDAQ 20% rule, Mason et al. find little evidence that shareholder 
voting provides benefits to bidder shareholders.113 
Unlike the Mason et al. study, a study of more recent transactions by Kai 
Li, Tingting Liu and J. Wu finds value in bidder shareholder voting. Li et 
al. investigate the effects of bidder shareholder voting by comparing deals 
subject to a vote with those not subject to a vote in a hand-collected sample 
of U.S. stock deals over the period 1995-2015.114 Li et al. find that bidder 
management substitutes stock with cash “to avoid triggering the 20% rule 
and hence shareholder voting; and that this maneuver is less likely to take 
place when acquirer institutional ownership is high.”115 The study also 
shows that in deals where the vote of bidder shareholders was avoided, 
acquirer announcement returns were 3% lower than those requiring 
shareholder voting.116 They point out that “[g]iven that the average acquirer 
has a market capitalization of $3.2 billion in the sample, a 3.0% difference 
in stock returns around the merger announcement corresponds to a value 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See Paul Mason et al., The Effect of Shareholder Voting Requirements on Method 
of Payment and Performance Outcomes in Acquisitions (Jan. 2, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844943. 
 112. See id. at 6.  
 113. See id. at 4, 6. One challenge with the study by Mason et al. is that the transactions 
that it studies happened almost twenty years ago. Much of this period is prior to significant 
development of acquisition-focused case law in the Delaware courts which focuses on 
potential conflicts in the sale of a company and thus provides incentives for target boards to 
advocate more aggressively for a higher price in sale transactions. See Lyondell Chem. Co. 
v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (“There is only one Revlon duty—to ‘[get] the best 
price for the stockholders at the sale of the company.’”); Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC 
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993) (stating that a negotiated acquisition is one of 
those “rare situations which mandate that a court take a more direct and active role in 
overseeing the decisions made and actions taken by directors”); id. at 44 (“In the sale of 
control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the transaction 
offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must exercise 
their fiduciary duties to further that end.”); In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 
439 (Del. Ch. 2012); In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 114. See Kai Li et al., Vote Avoidance and Shareholder Voting in Mergers and 
Acquisitions 1-2 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No. 
481/2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801580. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id.  
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reduction of over $96 million, an economically significant amount to 
acquirer shareholders.”117 The Li et al. study also finds “a large and 
significant jump in acquirer announcement returns at the 20% threshold in 
all-stock deals when shareholder voting is mandatory,” and this effect is 
concentrated among acquirers with more effective shareholder monitoring 
as proxied by high institutional ownership.118 They argue that “shareholder 
voting adds value because it commits acquirer management to make deals 
with greater synergies and strengthens its bargaining position against target 
management, which prevents overpayment.”119 
Other studies of U.S. transactions indicate that institutional shareholders 
value voting rights. For example, Gregor Matyos and Michael Ostrosky 
examine the holdings of institutional investors and their returns around 
merger announcements and find that although the votes are still 
overwhelmingly in favor of the merger, shareholders solely invested in the 
acquirer are generally four times more likely to vote against a merger as a 
cross-owner.120 Moreover, studies suggest that, on average, institutional 
shareholders value both voting and cash-flow rights. A study by Jennifer E. 
Bethel et al. finds that institutional buying before the record dates set for 
voting rights increases voting turnout but negatively relates to shareholder 
support of the merger.121  
In addition to institutional investors, voting rights may also invite 
activity from activist shareholders. In a working paper by Wei Jiang, Tao Li 
and Danqing Mei, the authors study forty-seven deals between 2000 and 
2014 where bidder shareholders had voting rights.122 According to the 
study, activists targeted stock deals that on average were much larger in 
size, so-called mega-deals, and deals that involved multiple bidders at 
announcement.123 In these transactions, activist shareholders were able to 
lower the premium paid to the target company and even block the 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 26. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in 
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 399 (2008). 
 121. See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights Around 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting, 15 J. 
CORP. FIN. 129, 131 (2009). 
 122. See Wei Jiang et al., Influencing Control: Jawboning in Risk Arbitrage 6, 9-10 
(Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 15-41, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587925. 
 123. For an explanation of bidder shareholder rights in large stock deals, see supra notes 
68-69 and accompanying text.  
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acquisition altogether.124 The authors posit that “[t]o the extent that a large 
number of acquisitions of public targets seem to be value destructive for 
acquirer shareholders, especially when compounded with weak 
governance . . . , activist arbitrageurs on the acquirer side constitute a 
powerful counterbalance.”125 
An important recently published study on the value of bidder shareholder 
voting rights was conducted by Becht, Polo and Rossi, focusing on 
acquisition transactions in the U.K.126 Unlike the United States, where there 
is little bidder shareholder involvement in acquisition transactions, for large 
acquisitions in the U.K., shareholder voting is both mandatory and 
binding.127 For shareholders of listed companies, Listing Rule 10 of the 
United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority requires prior approval from 
shareholders of the acquirer in transactions that are large relative to the 
acquirer (Class 1 transactions).128 The U.K. listing rules use several tests to 
measure relative size to determine a Class 1 transaction.129 “Each test 
employs a different measure of relative size.”130 A deal that equals or 
exceeds the 25% threshold in any one of these tests must obtain a vote from 
shareholders of the acquirer, while any transaction under this 25% threshold 
will not require shareholder voting.131 Reviewing a large sample of U.K. 
transactions over an eighteen-year period, Becht et al. find that the U.K.’s 
mandatory voting requirement positively impacts bidder shareholders.132 
More specifically, the study finds that shareholders gain eight cents per 
dollar at the announcement of a Class 1 deal, or $13.6 billion over 1992-
2010 in aggregate.133 In the U.K., relatively smaller Class 2 transactions do 
not require a vote, and shareholders lost $3 billion.134 Becht et al. argue that 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See Jiang et al., supra note 122 at 6, 32.  
 125. Id. at 6. 
 126. See Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3037. 
 127. See id.  
 128. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK, at Listing Rule 10 (2017) (U.K.), 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/10.pdf [hereinafter FCA HANDBOOK]. 
 129. See id. at Listing Rule 10.2.1, 10 Annex 1; Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3041–42. 
A class 1 transaction refers to a transaction that amounts to 25% or more of any of the 
acquirer’s gross assets, profits, or gross capital, or in which the consideration is 25% or more 
of the market capitalization of the acquirer’s common stock. FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 
128, at Listing Rule 10.2.2, 10 Annex 1. 
 130. Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3037. 
 131. See FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 128, at Listing Rule 10.2.2; Becht et al., supra note 
23, at 3037. 
 132. See Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3035, 3039.  
 133. Id. at 3035, 3050.  
 134. See id.  
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mandatory voting makes bidder management more likely to refrain from 
overpaying or proposing deals that are not in the interest of shareholders.135  
Interestingly, Becht et al. find that the mandatory voting mechanism 
works as a credible threat against bad corporate acquisitions because 
shareholders never voted against Class 1 transactions ex-post, and deals that 
were poorly received by the market at announcement were often withdrawn 
prior to the shareholder vote.136 Together with the study of U.S. transactions 
by Li et al., the study by Becht et al. provides important empirical support 
for greater consideration of shareholder voting rights by bidder 
shareholders. 
B. Why Voting Rights for Bidder Shareholders? 
Voting by shareholders “has come roaring back as a key part of 
American corporate governance.”137 Several important developments have 
led to the rise of shareholder voting: (1) government regulations that 
“require many institutions to vote their stock in the best interests of their 
beneficiaries”; (2) the emergence and increasing importance of proxy 
advisory firms, “which help address the costs of voting and the collective 
action problems inherent in coordinated institutional shareholder action”; 
and (3) the increasingly important corporate governance role played by 
activist investors, such as hedge funds, which has led to greater use of the 
ballot box and the accompanying result of greater institutional shareholder 
engagement with voting rights.138  
Edelman et al. set forth important theoretical support for shareholder 
voting rights, arguing that “shareholder voting should lead to value-
maximizing decisions for the firm as a whole,”139 an insight that is 
supported by the recent empirical research discussed in Section A above. 
They acknowledge that shareholders should not vote on routine decisions 
by management or the board of directors.140 Rather, they argue that a vote 
by shareholders can serve a “monitoring role if the issue being decided 
affects the company's stock price, or long-term value, and if the shareholder 
vote is likely to be superior, or complementary, to monitoring by the board 
or the market.”141 As they note, the supplemental monitoring role is 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See id. at 3061–62.  
 136. See id. at 3063–64.  
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 138. Id. at 1361. 
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especially significant when “officers or directors of the company suffer 
from a conflict of interest, or may otherwise be seeking private benefits at 
the expense of the firm.”142 These soft conflicts, agency problems, and 
biases are the exact types of situations that research indicates are implicated 
in significant acquisition decisions by public companies.143 
Two arguments against bidder shareholder voting rights in acquisition 
transactions relate to the cost of the vote as well as to concerns about the 
value of shareholder decisions. Voting is costly and uncertain, especially in 
a significant transaction, and could potentially lead to additional deal 
risk.144 Voting rights may also not result in shareholders making an 
informed decision, especially if shareholders are apathetic and/or suffer 
from collective action problems.145 
The above arguments against shareholder voting are tempered by the rise 
of institutional investors.146 Institutional investors have significant voting 
power since they own a majority of the shares of publicly traded 
companies.147 The significant change in ownership of U.S. public 
companies, resulting in a greater concentration of ownership in the hands of 
institutional shareholders,148 makes voting by bidder shareholders in large 
public company transactions much more palatable. The “[i]ncreased 
concentration of shareholding makes shareholder activism more rational, 
making it easier for shareholders to surmount the classic collective action 
problem that forms the basis for much of corp 
orate law, namely, the problem facing dispersed shareholders in 
disciplining management.”149 Their large ownership stake coupled with the 
increasing influence of other market participants, such as hedge funds and 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 1363, 1378. 
 144. See Langevoort, The Behavioral, supra note 48, at 75. 
 145. See id. at 69, 75-76.  
 146. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1741 (2008) (“[H]edge funds may attempt to play an activist 
role in a pending merger or acquisition generally by asking for a better price . . . or by trying 
to stop the pending acquisition.”). 
 147. See Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions, supra note 20, at 10.  
 148. See Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1386-88. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the 
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM L. REV. 863 (2013). 
 149. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (1991); see also Fisch, Standing Voting 
Instructions, supra note 20, at 11-12 (recounting various regulatory developments which led 
to greater institutional investor attention to exercising their voting rights). 
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proxy advisory firms, may mean that institutional investors have strong 
economic and political interests in monitoring management’s decisions via 
voting.150 Moreover, voting rights may invite interference from activists 
that focus on deals that may be risky or more prone to overpayment.151 
Even the threat of monitoring by institutional shareholders may be 
enough to address the bidder overpayment problem and its underlying 
causes. One argument against voting rights for bidder shareholders has been 
the significant transaction costs and deal uncertainty involved in providing 
the right.152 Becht et al., however, found that voting served as a deterrent to 
and constraint on overpayment, and in their sample, shareholders never 
voted against Class 1 transactions following announcement of the deal.153 
In essence, “the mere prospect of the vote,” rather than the actual vote 
itself, plays an important role in management calculations about the 
acquisition.154 Becht et al. also found “little evidence that the deal flow is 
affected by shareholder approval.”155 
Shareholder voting rights also implicate director primacy.156 Several 
scholars contend that deference to board decisions is both optimal and 
desirable.157 Stephen M. Bainbridge argues, for example, that “[i]n general 
shareholders of public corporations have neither the legal right, the 
practical ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for 
meaningful monitoring of the corporation’s agents.”158 But while board 
primacy may have some academic appeal, the argument is overstated.159 
Directors are not often the initiators or the driving force behind decisions to 
acquire another company; instead their primary role in acquisitions is to 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1401, 1418; Fisch, Standing Voting 
Instructions, supra note 20, at 12-13. 
 151. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text. 
 152. Langevoort, The Behavioral, supra note 48, at 75.  
 153. See Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3061, 3063–64. 
 154. Id. at 3050.  
 155. Id. at 3064.  
 156. Professor Bainbridge has long advocated for the value of the primacy of the board, 
including in acquisition decisions. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746-51 (2006); see also Margaret 
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
247, 251-55 (1999). 
 157. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). 
 158. Id. at 568. 
 159. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American 
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monitor management who are “the key decision makers in corporate 
decisions, a point that reflects the influence of market and economic 
realities more than a command from law.”160 Moreover, with respect to 
acquisition decisions, board primacy arguments fail to consider the vast 
empirical literature that suggests that boards, when confronted by 
management’s soft conflicts and behavioral biases in significant acquisition 
decisions, need the assistance of an additional monitor or check. 
So why have shareholders not advocated for voting rights in large 
acquisition transactions? Several reasons come to mind. First, large public 
company acquisitions often occur when companies are doing well and not 
when they are the target of shareholder advocates. Second, institutional 
shareholders have not always been strong governance advocates as a whole, 
especially without some pressure from more activist investors.161 And 
activist investors have little incentive to get involved in acquisition 
transactions if they do not have rights that can provide them with an ability 
to hold up the transaction.162 Moreover, acquisition activity tends to come 
in waves, and by the time the significance of overpayment by bidders 
becomes readily apparent, acquisitions may be on a downward trend, 
making the issue appear less salient to shareholder activists. 
In sum, the argument for shareholder voice in significant public company 
acquisition decisions is not an argument for shareholder voting rights in all 
transactions, but rather an argument for shareholder voice in situations of 
high importance to firm value and share price, and where empirical inquiry 
seems to consistently demonstrate shortcomings in the board’s monitoring 
role.163 
C. Achieving Voting Rights for Bidder Shareholders 
There are several ways to achieve voting rights for bidder shareholders in 
significant transactions. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to 
detail in full the costs, benefits, and feasibility of each of these ways, this 
section explores some of the general methods by which voting rights could 
be provided to bidder shareholders in significant acquisitions.  
One way to provide bidder shareholders with voting rights in large 
public company acquisitions is through amendment of stock exchange 
rules, akin to the listing rules adopted in the United Kingdom. Such an 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. at 404. 
 161. See generally Gilson & Gordon, supra note 148. 
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amendment would necessarily require significant advocacy by organized 
institutional investors. Advocacy of voting rights for bidder shareholders by 
institutional investors is not out of the realm of possibility. As scholars have 
observed, “the provision of finance through institutional investors . . . will 
produce investor groups that are better organized and more sophisticated in 
their inputs into the lawmaking process.”164 Shareholder voting has become 
increasingly important and more common over the past decade.165 Any 
amendment in listing rules to provide bidder shareholders with voting rights 
will likely be vociferously opposed by corporate managers and their 
advocates who have expressed deep reservations about greater shareholder 
power and say.166 Nevertheless, the greater voices of activists and 
institutional investors in public debates about corporate governance could 
be an important lever to pressure the U.S. stock exchanges to at least 
consider a debate over a voting rule for significant transactions in line with 
the U.K. listing rules.167 
Private ordering could be another solution for providing voting rights to 
bidder shareholders. Shareholders could advocate for either advisory votes 
or binding votes (through a charter or bylaw amendment) on significant 
public company acquisitions.168 Corporate charters and bylaws are often 
viewed as intra-corporate contracts.169 It is possible that shareholders could 
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advocate for corporate governance related voting rights to be encompassed 
within these contracts.170 As scholars have noted, however, a “charter 
amendment would require board approval and therefore the same frictions 
that explain the negative returns for acquirer shareholders—overconfidence 
and moral hazard—might explain why we do not see such charter 
amendments.”171 With respect to bylaws, the “scope of potential 
governance bylaws is very broad.”172 While there is some question about 
whether a mandatory shareholder vote for significant acquisitions via 
bylaws would be permissible under Delaware law,173 a bylaw which only 
provides a shareholder advisory vote for significant acquisitions may be 
less problematic as it would address the procedure by which the acquisition 
decision is made but would leave the board with final authority over the 
acquisition transaction.174 Conceivably, shareholder advocacy, even for 
advisory votes in significant acquisitions, could play an important 
governance role and may eventually lead to more mandatory provisions.175 
In the relatively recent past, for example, advocacy by shareholders on 
issues such as majority voting for directors has resulted in boards 
voluntarily adopting majority voting regimes, as well as significant 
legislative changes in corporate law.176  
IV. Conclusion 
Large public company acquisitions often destroy value for the acquiring 
firm. Empirical literature suggests that the bidder overpayment problem is 
driven by behavioral biases of the bidder’s management or soft conflicts of 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 497 
(2016).   
 171. Becht et al., supra note 23, at 3064; see Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 
168, at 7 n. 33. 
 172. See Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 8. 
 173. Whether changes in bylaws could effectively provide shareholders a voice in 
acquisition decisions would likely be subject to debate since bylaws are often viewed by 
courts as “procedural” and “process-oriented.” See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension 
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008); Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 19-
20. There is some tension between the AFSCME case and other decisions of Delaware courts 
which have been much more open to the shareholders’ powers to amend bylaws. See Fisch, 
Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 4. 
 174. See Fisch, Governance by Contract, supra note 168, at 16. 
 175. See Edelman et al., supra note 16, at 1369; see also Fisch, Governance by Contract, 
supra note 168, at 24 (arguing that proxy advisory firms have increased the focus on “board 
failures to respond to shareholder demands). 
 176. See Armour et al., supra note 164, at 268. 
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interests on the part of bidder management where management seeks to 
extract private benefits from the deal. Several recent empirical studies 
suggest that voting rights for bidder shareholders in significant acquisition 
transactions will play an important role in reducing value-destructive 
acquisitions. This article argues that it is time for corporate law to respond 
to this literature and reassess bidder shareholder voting rights. 
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